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Posner, Blackstone, and Prior Restraints on Speech 
Ashutosh Bhagwat* 
Judge Richard Posner recently asserted that the original 
understanding of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was to 
prohibit “censorship”—meaning prior restraints—but not subsequent 
punishments. Posner was following in the footsteps of many other 
eminent jurists including Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Joseph Story, 
James Wilson, and ultimately William Blackstone. 
The problem is, this claim is simply wrong. Firstly, it misquotes 
Blackstone. Blackstone said that the liberty of the press meant only 
freedom from prior restraints; he never discussed speech. When one does 
examine the Speech Clause, it becomes quite clear that its protections 
cannot be limited to freedom from prior restraints. Most importantly, 
this is because during the Framing era, when speech meant in-person, 
oral communication, no system of prior restraints on speech was 
remotely possible or ever envisioned. So, if the Speech Clause only bans 
prior restraints, it bans nothing. A broader reading of the Speech 
Clause is also supported by its (admittedly sketchy) history, and by an 
examination of the political theory underlying the American 
Revolution. Indeed, not only is the Speech Clause not limited to 
banning prior restraints, but a close examination of the historical 
evidence strongly suggests—though this issue cannot be definitively 
resolved—that a substantial portion of the Framing generation 
probably read the Press Clause more broadly as well. 
What lessons can be learned from this? The first is a need for great 
caution in “translating” Framing era understandings into our 
modern—and very different—technological and cultural context. 
Second, when seeking “original understandings” of the Constitution, it 
is important to be aware that consensus sometimes simply did not exist. 
Indeed, the Framers may have given no consideration at all to specific 
issues, thus indicating limits on the usefulness of the entire 
originalist enterprise. 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis School of Law. B.A. 1986 Yale University. 
J.D. 1990 The University of Chicago. Contact: aabhagwat@ucdavis.edu. Thanks to Dick 
Posner for an extremely illuminating conversation. Full disclosure: I clerked for Judge Posner 
from 1991 to 1992. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2012, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit decided American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. 
Alvarez, holding that an Illinois statute prohibiting the taping of 
conversations without the consent of all parties to the conversation, 
as applied to a program intending to openly record police officers 
performing their duties in public, violated the First Amendment.1 
Judge Richard Posner dissented. Most of his opinion concerned the 
impact of the proposed recordings on privacy and on police 
effectiveness. However, in an introductory passage Judge Posner had 
this to say about the broader history of the First Amendment: 
Judges asked to affirm novel “interpretations” of the First 
Amendment should be mindful that the constitutional right of free 
speech, as construed nowadays, is nowhere to be found in the 
Constitution. The relevant provision of the First Amendment 
merely forbids Congress to abridge free speech, which as 
understood in the eighteenth century meant freedom only from 
censorship (that is, suppressing speech, rather than just punishing 
the speaker after the fact). A speaker could be prosecuted for 
seditious libel, for blasphemy, and for much other reprobated 
speech besides, but in a prosecution he would at least have the 
protection of trial by jury, which he would not have if hauled 
before a censorship board; and his speech or writing would not 
have been suppressed, which is what censorship boards do. 
Protection against censorship was the only protection that the 
amendment was understood to create.2 
In support of his argument, Judge Posner cited Justice Holmes’s 
famous (or infamous) opinion in Patterson v. Colorado3 and 
Blackstone’s Commentaries,4 along with Seventh Circuit precedent5 
and Akhil Amar’s groundbreaking work on the Bill of Rights.6 He 
then emphasized that limiting the First Amendment to condemning 
 
 1.  679 F.3d 583, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 3.  Id. (citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 461–62 (1907)). 
 4.  Id. (comparing with 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 150–53 (1769)). 
 5.  Id. (citing Blue Canary Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 251 F.3d 1121, 1123 (7th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 6.  Id. (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 23–24 (1998)). 
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censorship—meaning a system of prior restraints through licensing—
“is the original understanding,” arguing that this fact should make 
judges hesitant to adopt aggressive expansions of the right of 
free speech.7 
Judge Posner’s understanding of the First Amendment’s history 
as reaching only prior restraints on speech has a long pedigree and 
strong support. In addition to Holmes and Blackstone, he could 
easily have cited Joseph Story,8 leading Framer and later Supreme 
Court Justice James Wilson,9 and two early cases from Pennsylvania10 
and Massachusetts.11 The problem is that this understanding is 
wrong. And not only is it wrong, aspects of it are clearly and 
obviously wrong. How could the preeminent appellate judge of his 
generation (to say nothing of his illustrious sources) possibly make 
such a mistake? 
In this brief essay, I seek to shed some light on this conundrum, 
and on the relationship between prior restraints and First 
Amendment history more generally. What emerges from this 
investigation is a complex set of fundamental issues, including 
evolving linguistic meanings and understandings due to changing 
culture and technology, the oversimplification by many of a very 
complex history, and most fundamentally, an overly aggressive push 
 
 7.  Id. at 610–11 (emphasis in original). 
 8.  2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1880, at 610 (4th ed. 1873) (“It is plain, then, that the language of this amendment 
imports no more than that every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions 
upon any subject whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always that he does not injure any 
other person in his rights, person, property, or reputation; and so always that he does not 
thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the government.”). 
 9.  See LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 204–05 (1985) (describing 
James Wilson adopting this position at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 99 (Neil H. 
Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS] (reprinting the text of a 
speech Wilson gave at the convention in which he articulated the position); Philip B. Kurland, 
The Original Understanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision of the First Amendment, 55 
MISS. L.J. 225, 235–36 (1985). 
 10.  Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. 319 (1788). 
 11.  Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313–14 (Mass. 1825) (“[I]t is well 
understood, and received as a commentary on this provision for the liberty of the press, that it 
was intended to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practised 
[sic] by other governments, and in early times here, to stifle the efforts of patriots towards 
enlightening their fellow subjects upon their rights and the duties of rulers. The liberty of the 
press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like 
the right to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance 
or destruction.”). 
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by lawyers to find consensus among the Framing generation in the 
face of overwhelming evidence of ambiguity and disagreement. 
I. MISQUOTING BLACKSTONE12 
Our story begins with a misquotation of sorts. As noted above, 
in his dissent in ACLU v. Alvarez Judge Posner stated that the 
original understanding of the First Amendment was that it protected 
speech only against “censorship,” meaning prior restraints.13 In 
support of his argument, he cited numerous sources, including 
Justice Holmes’s Patterson opinion and Blackstone’s Commentaries.14 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England are the 
primary source of the theory that the First Amendment forbids only 
prior restraints, largely because of the strong influence Blackstone 
had on the Framing generation’s understanding of traditional 
English common law rights. Given the importance of Blackstone, it 
is worthwhile to examine the precise, oft-quoted language 
Blackstone uses: “The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the 
nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints 
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal 
matter when published.”15 
This language is repeated almost verbatim in the 1825 Blanding 
decision from Massachusetts, though oddly without citing 
Blackstone,16 and by Joseph Story in his Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, this time with proper attribution.17 
Blanding in turn was the primary source of Justice Holmes’s 
comment in Patterson that “the main purpose of [freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press] is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints 
 
 12.  Cf. BART D. EHRMAN, MISQUOTING JESUS: THE STORY BEHIND WHO CHANGED 
THE BIBLE AND WHY (2007). 
 13.  679 F.3d 583, 610 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 14.  See supra notes 3−4 and accompanying text. 
 15.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 151. It should be noted in passing that the actual 
words Blackstone and most early commentators used were “previous restraints,” not “prior 
restraints.” The phrase “prior restraints” was first used by the Supreme Court in 1931 in Near 
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 733 (1931). It quickly, however, became standard 
usage. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 648 (1955); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 16.  Blanding, 3 Pick. at 313–14. 
 17.  STORY, supra note 8, § 1884, at 612–13 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, 
at 151). 
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upon publications as had been practiced by other governments.’”18 
Completing the circle, in Alvarez Judge Posner cites Patterson19 and 
Blackstone,20 as well as the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Blue Canary 
Corp. v. City of Milwaukee21 (an opinion which he also authored) and 
Akhil Amar’s The Bill of Rights.22 In Blue Canary, Judge Posner 
wrote that “Blackstone defined freedom of speech and the press as 
freedom from prior restraints.”23 Amar’s own sources are Blackstone, 
the speech by James Wilson discussed above,24 and Story.25 
Ultimately, then, it all goes back to Blackstone (assuming that 
Wilson’s views were shaped by Blackstone, as seems 
exceedingly likely). 
The problem is, Blackstone himself does not say what Posner 
attributes to him. Blackstone speaks only of the “liberty of the 
press”;26 he says nothing about speech. Similarly, when Wilson spoke 
at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, he mentioned only freedom 
of the press, not speech.27 There are good historical reasons for this, 
as we will discuss shortly, but for now the key point is that in Alvarez 
and Blue Canary, Posner is extending the classic Blackstonian 
argument beyond its original limits. Indeed, Blackstone has precisely 
nothing to say about freedom of speech, as opposed to the press, 
because his Commentaries concern the English common law, not the 
First Amendment, and the English common law of the eighteenth 
century did not recognize any broad right to freedom of speech.28 
(As we shall see, the same is true of most of the American States 
prior to 1789.) 
To be fair, Judge Posner is in good, indeed the highest, 
company. As we have seen, Joseph Story made the same leap. While 
 
 18.  Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (quoting Blanding, 3 Pick. 
at 313). 
 19.  679 F.3d 583, 610 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing Patterson, 205 
U.S. at 461–62). 
 20.  Id. (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 4). 
 21.  Id. (citing Blue Canary Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 251 F.3d 1121, 1123 (7th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 22.  Id. (citing AMAR, supra note 6, at 23–24). 
 23.  Blue Canary, 251 F.3d at 1123. 
 24.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 25.  AMAR, supra note 6, at 23 n.19. 
 26.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 4. 
 27.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 204. 
 28.  Id. at 3, 5. 
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Story limits himself to discussing liberty of the press in his specific 
discussion of Blackstone,29 he had previously stated firmly (though 
without support) that “the language of [the First] amendment 
imports no more than that every man shall have a right to speak, 
write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, without 
any prior restraint.”30 Similarly, in Patterson, Justice Holmes refers to 
both freedom of speech and the press in reference to prior restraints, 
even though his main source, Blanding, refers only to 
“publications.”31 The question is whether the distinction between 
speech and the press really makes any difference. As it turns out, 
it does. 
II. SPEECH VERSUS THE PRESS 
The First Amendment provides, inter alia, that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”32 
Many commentators have noted, however, that the modern Supreme 
Court has failed to meaningfully distinguish between the Speech and 
Press Clauses, essentially subsuming the Press Clause into the Speech 
Clause.33 Even in cases where a law directly regulates the press, and 
the plaintiff explicitly invokes the Press Clause, the Court’s habit is 
to refer generically to “the First Amendment.”34 This blending of 
two distinct provisions has generally been thought not to matter 
because the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the view that 
the Press Clause gives special rights or protections to the 
institutional press or any other distinct group of speakers, and so 
 
 29.  STORY, supra note 8, § 1884, at 612–13. 
 30.  Id. § 1880, at 610. 
 31.  Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 313 (Mass. 1825)). 
 32.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 33.  Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: 
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 
258 (2004) (citing David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430, 448–
50 (2002); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 22-b21 (3d 
ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001)); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1029, 1037 (2015). 
 34.  See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 582–83, 591–93 (1983); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679–82 (1972); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 821–22 (1974). 
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both clauses protect communications, presumably in parallel ways.35 
It turns out, however, that ignoring the Press Clause as a distinct 
source of constitutional principles has the consequence of blinding 
one to important differences between speech and the press. 
To understand the differences clearly, it is important to bear in 
mind the nature of communications technologies in 1789–1791, 
when the First Amendment was drafted and ratified. At that time, 
there were essentially three methods of communication: oral, 
unamplified speech; hand-written correspondence; and printed 
materials created using a printing press. Once this is recognized, the 
distinct functions of the Speech and Press Clauses become clear: the 
Speech Clause protects oral communications, and the Press Clause 
protects the printing press and its products.36 And indeed, the most 
careful modern scholarship tends to confirm the view that the Press 
Clause was intended and has been understood to protect a particular 
technology: the printing press (as opposed to a favored group of 
speakers, the institutional press).37 Moreover, this reading fits well 
with Blackstone and the history of prior restraints. After all, the 
historical licensing regime in England and its demise in the late 
seventeenth century,38 which engendered Blackstone’s definition of 
press freedom as a lack of previous restraints, extended to all uses of 
the printing press, not just the printing of newspapers.39 The Press 
Clause limits governmental regulation of the printing press, and one 
 
 35.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010); id. 
at 390 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 703–05; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 
303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132–33 (1937); First 
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797–801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 36.  This of course leaves open the status of hand-written communications. Perhaps the 
Framers meant to subsume such communications in the Speech Clause, or perhaps they simply 
did not consider the matter; it is hard to tell, especially because, as we shall see, the Framers 
paid little or no attention to any aspect of the Speech Clause. 
 37.  Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? 
From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012); see also Michael W. McConnell, 
Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 429–46 (2013); 
Anderson, supra note 33, at 446–47. 
 38.  See Emerson, supra note 15, at 651; Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of 
The Prior Restraint Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the 
Separation of Powers, 34 IND. L. REV. 295, 305 (2001); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 
U.S. 233, 245–46 (1936). 
 39.  See BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 152 n.a. 
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key limitation (albeit not necessarily the only one40) is that it forbids 
licensing, or as Judge Posner calls it, “censorship” of the press.41 
If that is what the Press Clause was understood to mean, what 
about the Speech Clause? This is a very difficult question to answer 
because, as Philip Kurland has noted, the Framers were almost 
entirely focused on freedom of the press, largely ignoring freedom of 
speech.42 The behavior of the colonies and early states confirms this 
focus. No colonial charter prior to the American Revolution 
protected a general right of free speech, though they did protect the 
rights of legislators during legislative sessions.43 Moreover, of the 
original thirteen states, only one—Pennsylvania—provided 
protection for freedom of speech in its state constitution at the time 
of ratification,44 though many state constitutions did refer to the 
freedom of the press.45 Perhaps most tellingly, the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights of June, 1776 drafted by George Mason, 
considered the Father of the Bill of Rights, protects freedom of the 
press, but does not mention free speech.46 Indeed, as late as Joseph 
Story, the preeminence of the press right over the speech right 
remained. The section of his Commentaries discussing the Speech 
and Press Clauses begins with the phrase “[t]he next clause of the 
amendment respects the liberty of the press,” but then quotes both 
the Speech and Press Clauses.47 
The pre-Framing neglect of freedom of speech might be taken to 
suggest that the Framers simply did not care about free speech, as 
opposed to a free press. But that cannot be quite right. After all, 
despite his omission in 1776, Mason did include an explicit freedom 
 
 40.  See infra Part III. 
 41.  ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 610 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 42.  Kurland, supra note 9, at 237; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment 
Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 
1, 15 (2011). 
 43.  David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 
431 (1983). 
 44.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 5. By the time the First Amendment was ratified on 
December 15, 1791, a fourteenth state—Vermont—had been added which did protect 
freedom of speech. Id. at 186; Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 15. But the fact remains that 
during the Framing period, freedom of speech was almost entirely neglected. 
 45.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 184–85. 
 46.  See The Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 12 (1776), http://www.archives.gov/ 
exhibits/charters/virginia_declaration_of_rights.html. 
 47.  STORY, supra note 8, § 1880, at 609. 
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of speech provision in his Master Draft of the Bill of Rights, which 
became the model for James Madison’s eventual proposal for a bill of 
rights to the first Congress.48 And James Madison also, of course, 
included free speech in his proposed constitutional amendments 
which eventually resulted in the Bill of Rights.49 Indeed, during 
congressional debates, Madison described freedom of speech and of 
the press as among “the most valuable on the whole list.”50 Finally, 
Kurland’s suggestion that free speech was simply seen as an element 
of free exercise also cannot be sustained.51 Free speech and free 
exercise are distinct rights granted separate protection in the Bill of 
Rights. Moreover, despite their pairing in the final text of the First 
Amendment, the drafting history of the First Amendment clearly 
reveals that the Framers did not even consider speech and religion to 
be particularly related to each other; the combining of speech and 
religion in a single amendment occurred very late in the legislative 
process and appears to be more a historical coincidence than 
anything else.52 
Freedom of speech, then, is a distinct right, which was 
consciously added to the Constitution in addition to freedom of the 
press (and to free exercise of religion). Moreover, Blackstone and 
other contemporaries defined freedom of the press as barring only 
prior restraints, not freedom of speech. Perhaps, however, Judge 
Posner’s extension of Blackstone to speech can be justified on the 
grounds that speech and press rights are parallel rights, which mean 
the same thing—freedom from prior restraints, and nothing else. A 
brief consideration of technology and practicalities, however, 
demonstrates that this is a most unlikely reading. 
 
 48.  See George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights, CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, ¶ 
16, http://www.constitution.org/gmason/amd_gmas.htm [hereinafter Mason’s Master 
Draft]. Interestingly, Mason’s proposal extended not just to speech and the press, but also to 
“writing and publishing,” seemingly covering hand-written correspondence as well. 
 49.  THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 83. 
 50.  David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression 
in Early American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795, 832 (1985). 
 51.  See Kurland, supra note 9, at 237. 
 52.  See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the Instrumental 
Value of Religious Groups, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 73, 91–92 (2014) (describing drafting history 
of the First Amendment, and noting that the Speech and Religion Clauses did not become 
combined in a single amendment until September 9, 1789, just weeks before final adoption, 
and furthermore that the Clauses were combined with no explanation). 
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The most obvious reason why freedom of speech, as understood 
in 1791, could not have been limited to a bar on prior restraints is 
that an actual system of prior restraints on speech was, and is, 
impossible. In no conceivable universe could the government require 
permission from censors before citizens could speak, or even speak 
on political issues (remember, for the Framers to speak meant to 
speak in person, without amplification). The very idea of such a 
system is profoundly silly. This point, of course, has been recognized 
before. Thomas Cooley, the author of the leading constitutional 
treatise of the latter nineteenth century, commented that “the mere 
exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is secured by 
the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be uttered 
orally there can be no previous censorship . . . .”53 Zechariah Chafee, 
the leading American free speech scholar of the first part of the 
twentieth century, quoted Cooley’s language, and described his 
argument as “unanswerable.”54 And despite Posner’s citation to him, 
Akhil Amar in The Bill of Rights went so far as to describe the idea 
that the freedom of speech can be limited to freedom from prior 
restraints as “utterly outlandish,” precisely because licensing speech 
is impossible.55 
In short, numerous scholars over the past century and a half have 
pointed out that whatever the meaning of freedom of the press, the 
idea that freedom of speech means only freedom from prior 
restraints is quite obviously wrong, even “outlandish.” Nor was this 
objection to a narrow reading of the Free Speech Clause unknown to 
the Framing generation. The leading Jeffersonian politician (and 
later Secretary of the Treasury) Albert Gallatin, in a speech in 
opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798, said the following: 
But that contended for, to wit, that the only prohibition was that 
of passing any law laying previous restraints upon either, was 
absurd, so far as it related to speech; for it pre-supposed that 
Congress, by the Constitution, as it originally stood, might have 
passed laws laying such restraints upon speech; and what these 
possibly could have been, he was altogether at a loss to conceive, 
unless gentlemen chose to assert that the Constitution had given 
Congress a power to seal the mouths or to cut the tongues of the 
 
 53.  THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 421 (1868). 
 54.  ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1941). 
 55.  AMAR, supra note 6, at 224. 
BHAGWAT.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016  4:26 PM 
1151 Posner, Blackstone, and Prior Restraints on Speech 
 1161 
citizens of the Union; and these, however, were the only means by 
which previous restraints could be laid on the freedom of speech. 
Was it not evident, that, as speech could not be restrained, but 
might be punished, a Constitutional clause forbidding any 
abridgment of the freedom of speech must necessarily mean, not 
that no laws should be passed laying previous restraints upon it, but 
that no punishment by law be inflicted upon it?56 
Quoting this passage the scholar Leonard Levy, considered to be 
the leading modern defender of the view that the First Amendment 
was understood to bar only prior restraints, explicitly acknowledged 
that because previous restraints on speech were nonexistent and 
impossible, freedom of speech was never understood to mean “the 
absence of prior restraints.”57 
To be fair, despite Gallatin’s and others’ strong language, it is 
not quite true that speech can never be licensed. As Judge Posner 
himself pointed out in Blue Canary, there is one historical example 
of prior restraints on speech: the licensing of plays in Shakespearean 
England.58 No one, however, could seriously argue that the sole 
purpose of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was to 
prevent the licensing of plays. Such a reading is absurdly narrow,59 
and ignores the obviously political focus of the Free Speech Clause 
(as well as the Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses which 
accompany it).60 In truth, very little theater existed in colonial 
America, in no small part because of religious objections to it, 
making a theater-focused reading of the First Amendment 
particularly implausible. 
The implication of the fact that prior restraints on speech are 
impossible is clear: a reading of the First Amendment limiting the 
Free Speech Clause to bar only prior restraints would make freedom 
of speech a nullity, providing no actual protections. To be sure, as 
noted earlier, the Framing generation paid little attention to freedom 
 
 56.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 302–03. 
 57.  Id. at 303–04 & n.80. 
 58.  Blue Canary Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 251 F.3d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 59.  Under this view, the entire free speech jurisprudence of the Supreme Court would 
consist of Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (treating as an 
invalid prior restraint a system by which a municipality granted permission to use its theater 
only after reviewing the content of productions, and denying permission for Hair). 
 60.  See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 991–92 (2011). 
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of speech, as opposed to the press.61 Nonetheless, freedom of speech 
was considered important enough by Madison and Mason to include 
in the Bill of Rights, and during congressional debates Madison 
identified the Speech and Press Clauses as “among ‘the most 
valuable on the whole list.’”62 It would be odd, to say the least, if 
one of the most valuable rights in the entire Bill of Rights 
protected nothing. 
In addition to simple logic, what we know of the history of the 
Free Speech Clause also tends to confirm that it was understood to 
protect against subsequent punishment, not previous restraint. The 
roots of protections for free speech are a bit foggy because the 
English common law did not provide any general free speech 
protection,63 free speech is not discussed in Blackstone, and speech 
was similarly neglected in colonial charters and early state 
constitutions with the exception of Pennsylvania.64 It is not quite 
true, however, that early English and American law provided no 
speech protections—there was one specific type of speech which was 
protected, and that was the speech of legislators. The English Bill of 
Rights of 1689, an obviously foundational document, explicitly 
extended protection to speech and debate within Parliament, 
providing “[t]hat the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings 
in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court 
or place out of Parliament.”65 Following this model, colonial charters 
similarly protected the speech rights of their members (during 
sessions of the legislature), and such rights were generally 
respected.66 Finally, the original (unamended) United States 
Constitution of course provides that members of Congress “shall not 
be questioned in any other [p]lace” for “any Speech or Debate in 
either House.”67 Obviously, these provisions were not intended to 
prevent only prior restraints—by their very language they protect 
primarily against subsequent punishment. As such, they provide a 
 
 61.  See supra text accompanying notes 42–47. 
 62.  Rabban, supra note 50, at 832. 
 63.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 3, 5. 
 64.  See supra text accompanying note 44. 
 65.  English Bill of Rights (1689), http://www.constitution.org/eng/eng_bor.htm; see 
also LEVY, supra note 9, at 14. 
 66.  David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 
431–34 (1983). 
 67.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
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clear precedent for protecting speech against more than 
prior restraints. 
Moreover, there can be little doubt that the Speech and Debate 
Clause and its forebears, notably in the English Bill of Rights, had an 
important influence on the First Amendment, and more generally on 
understandings of what the phrase “freedom of speech” meant. It 
cannot be a coincidence that the phrase “freedom of speech” in the 
First Amendment exactly matches the words of the English Bill of 
Rights, and as David Bogen notes, prior to the American Revolution 
the phrase “freedom of speech” in colonial charters inevitably 
referred to the rights of legislators, which surely must have 
influenced assumptions about what the right meant when extended 
to all citizens.68 Similarly, Philip Kurland recognizes that the term 
“freedom of speech” in pre-Revolutionary America was used to refer 
to immunity from subsequent punishment on the part of 
legislators.69 Finally, Akhil Amar has elaborated more extensively on 
the connections between legislative “freedom of speech” and the 
First Amendment. He points out that the Parliamentary privilege of 
freedom of speech was closely tied to the English Whig theory that 
sovereignty rested in Parliament.70 When the American 
Revolutionaries adopted a theory of popular sovereignty, it followed 
logically that the parliamentary privilege should be extended to 
sovereign citizens71—and to reiterate, that privilege was not freedom 
from prior restraints; it was a bar on subsequent prosecution. 
In light of the overwhelming evidence set forth above that the 
phrase “freedom of speech” in the First Amendment was not limited 
to a bar on prior restraints, from where does this misunderstanding 
originate? The answer must lie in the seemingly parallel treatment of 
speech and the press in the language of the First Amendment 
(“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press”).72 Presumably, the reasoning is that given this 
formulation, surely the rights must be coextensive. That quick 
assumption, however, is suspect for three distinct reasons. The first is 
that this verbal parallelism was not always a part of the proposed 
 
 68.  Bogen, supra note 43, at 431. 
 69.  Kurland, supra note 9, at 255. 
  70.  AMAR, supra note 6, at 223. 
 71.  Id. at 24–25; see also Kurland, supra note 9, at 255. 
 72.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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amendment. James Madison’s original proposal to Congress did not 
describe the right to speech and the “freedom of the press” in 
identical or even parallel language. It read, in its entirety, as follows: 
“The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to 
speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of 
the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall 
be inviolable.”73 
This language, which is essentially identical to the language in 
George Mason’s Master Draft of the Bill of Rights,74 quite clearly 
treats “freedom of the press” as a concept quite distinct from the 
separate protections for the “right to speak, to write, or to publish.” 
During the drafting process this language was shortened to its 
current form and combined with the Assembly and Petition Clauses 
(as well as, much later, with the Religion Clauses).75 But there is 
absolutely no indication that these changes were intended to change 
the substantive content of the amendment, or to create an identity 
between the speech and press rights. 
Second, focusing on the connection between speech and the 
press ignores the broader context of the First Amendment, an 
unfortunately common occurrence.76 The Free Speech Clause is 
paired in the First Amendment not only with the Press Clause, but 
also with the Assembly and Petition Clauses.77 Speech, press, 
assembly, and petition are all (in the words of the Supreme Court) 
“cognate” rights that protect parallel, interconnected political 
functions essential to democratic self-governance.78 Yet no one 
 
 73.  THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 83. 
 74.  Mason’s language read, “That the People have a right to Freedom of speech, and of 
writing and publishing their Sentiments; that the Freedom of the Press is one of the great 
Bulwarks of Liberty, and ought not to be violated.” See Mason’s Master Draft, supra note 48, 
at ¶ 16. 
 75.  THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 84–92. 
 76.  See, e.g., JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY 61–62 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has not invoked the Assembly 
Clause of the First Amendment in over thirty years, essentially merging the freedom of 
assembly into speech). 
 77.  It also appears in the company of the Religion Clauses, but as noted earlier, that 
juxtaposition, unlike the combining of the political rights of speech, the press, assembly, and 
petition, appears to have been a product of historic accident. See supra note 52 and 
accompanying text. 
 78.  See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516, 530 (1945). For a broader discussion of the connections between the political rights in 
the First Amendment, see Bhagwat, supra note 60, at 984–85. 
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would argue that the assembly and petition rights mean no more 
than freedom from prior restraints. The petition right is based 
directly on the petition right granted in the English Bill of Rights 
(though its roots are much older79), the language of which explicitly 
protects against subsequent prosecution.80 And as Tabatha Abu El-
Haj has extensively demonstrated, assemblies were understood 
through the first century of the American Republic to be protected 
from both permitting requirements and subsequent prosecution, 
unless they were disruptive or violent.81 Thus, of the four interlinked 
political rights protected by the First Amendment, only the press 
right was associated with freedom from prior restraints, an 
association that arose because of the historical prominence of the 
battle over press licensing from its imposition in the sixteenth 
century to its abandonment by Parliament in 1694–95, following the 
Glorious Revolution.82 
The third and final reason why simple parallelism between the 
Speech and Press Clauses is unwarranted is more fundamental: when 
drafted, the two clauses protected fundamentally different human 
activities. As noted earlier,83 during the Framing era there was a 
fundamental difference between what the speech clause protected—
unamplified, in-person oral communication—and what the press 
clause protected—printed products created using the printing press. 
These were distinct forms of communication, indeed two of the only 
three forms of communication (along with hand-written notes and 
letters) available given eighteenth-century technology, and they had 
very different social significance. Oral speech, by its nature, could 
reach only small audiences, especially given the lack of amplification. 
The power of speech to organize and persuade, and thus the risks 
speech posed to society, were inherently limited.  On the other hand, 
the press was a form, indeed the only form, of mass communication 
capable of reaching thousands. Books and pamphlets could shape 
 
 79.  See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1299–1300 (2008). 
 80.  English Bill of Rights, supra note 65 (“That it is the right of the subjects to petition 
the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.”). 
 81.  See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, All Assemble: Order and Disorder in Law, Politics and 
Culture, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 949, 992–93 (2014); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the 
People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 42–45 (2011). 
 82.  See Meyerson, supra note 38, at 298–305. 
 83.  See supra Part II, para. 2. 
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opinion and engender mass action in ways that no other form of 
communication could even come close to doing. That, of course, is 
why England imposed licensing on the press prior to the Glorious 
Revolution, and it is also why the Framing generation focused on 
freedom of the press and largely ignored freedom of speech. Speech 
just was not that important, and had not historically been subject to 
anything like the social controls, censorship, and suppression as had 
products of the printing press.  
Indeed, even Blackstone appears to concede this point. In the 
passage in which Blackstone defines freedom of the press as a lack of 
previous restraints, he clarifies that this means the law is permitted to 
“punish . . . any dangerous or offensive writings.”84 He then goes on 
to defend this rule: “Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon 
freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still 
left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments, 
destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society 
corrects.”85 At least one natural reading of this passage is that what 
the law condemns is the public distribution of “bad sentiments” 
through the press; but freedom of conscience and private speech 
remain in place. The reason, of course, is that mass dissemination of 
dangerous ideas threatens “the preservation of peace and good 
order,”86 whereas private activities do not. 
The difficulties with translating historical understandings into 
contemporary law arise from the fact that the sharp historical 
distinctions between speech and the press have blurred in modern 
times. Doctrinally, as noted earlier, the Press Clause has been largely 
subsumed into the Speech Clause in the past century (almost a 
reversal of the Framing era).87 But doctrine and the Court are not 
the cause of the confusion; they merely reflect a more basic driving 
force, which is changing technology. While drawing a clear 
distinction between speech and the press was easy in 1791, it 
obviously no longer is today. Even by the end of the nineteenth 
century, with the invention of the telegraph and telephone, 
distinctions were blurring as speech gradually ceased to be limited to 
in-person communication. But more modern inventions, such as 
 
 84.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 152 (emphasis added). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  See supra Part II, para. 1. 
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broadcasting, cable television, and now the Internet, have utterly 
broken down any clear lines. Are television and radio broadcasts 
more analogous to speech, or to the press? Both are forms of mass 
communication, after all, but much of the communication is oral (all 
of the communication in the case of radio). And what of a website? 
Does it matter if a website consists of written words or video clips? 
Should it? And what about a tweet, or a Facebook post?  
These questions seem absurd because they are—today, all forms 
of communications are merging with each other, and they tend to 
share common traits with both historical speech and the historical 
press. In particular, much communication has potentially mass 
audiences, paralleling the historical press, but its ubiquity (and so its 
inability to be controlled ex ante) makes it more like speech. The 
modern judicial solution has been to abandon the speech/press 
distinction and call everything “speech.” This collapsing is perhaps 
inevitable given technological developments, and it is probably wise 
as a matter of social policy. It, however, has absolutely no historical 
basis. Whatever our current practice, neither the Framers nor the 
generation that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment (who had the 
telegraph, but no other modern communications technology)88 
equated speech and the press. 
III. WHAT OF THE PRESS? 
For all of the above reasons, it seems reasonably clear that the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was not understood to 
be limited to freedom from “censorship” or “previous restraints.” 
But what about the press? Is it true that the original intent of the 
First Amendment’s Press Clause was to adopt the limited, 
Blackstonian definition? These questions matter because, for the 
reasons noted at the end of Part II, there is at least an argument to 
be made that much of modern communication, because of its 
potential to reach mass audiences, is more analogous to the Framers’ 
understanding of the press than their understanding of speech. If so, 
then a purported strict originalist89 would presumably feel obliged to 
 
 88.  The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. This timing matters, of course, 
because the “freedom of speech and of the press” applies to the states because it has been 
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 89.  This strict originalist presumably shares an apartment with those other elusive 
characters, the reasonable person and the rational economic actor. 
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protect such communications only from licensing or other 
prior restraints. 
In fact, however, even with respect to the press, Judge Posner’s 
assertion that freedom from prior restraints “is the original 
understanding”90 of the First Amendment moves too fast. First, 
consider his sources. Recall that Posner cites in support of his 
assertion an opinion by Justice Holmes, one of his own earlier 
opinions, Akhil Amar, and Blackstone.91 Leaving aside the citation to 
his previous opinion, which did not truly address the question of 
whether freedom of the press meant only no prior restraints, let us 
consider each of these sources. 
Posner’s first citation is to Justice Holmes’s opinion in Patterson 
v. Colorado.92 There are, however, two clear problems with this use of 
Holmes. First, Holmes does not say in Patterson that freedom from 
previous restraints is the only purpose of the First Amendment, but 
that freedom from previous restraints was “the main purpose.”93 It 
should be added that even in Patterson, the first Justice Harlan wrote 
a powerful dissent explicitly rejecting the Blackstonian position.94 
Second, and more fundamentally, Holmes of course famously 
recanted this view, first explicitly in the Schenck decision announcing 
the clear and present danger test,95 and then more definitively, albeit 
implicitly, in his separate opinions that became the foundation of 
modern free speech law.96 Thus, Holmes is a weak source for such a 
strong assertion. 
Posner also relies on Akhil Amar, and in particular on his book 
The Bill of Rights.97 Amar, however, is also a problematic source. 
Although Amar does discuss the importance of juries as a shield 
against unjust prosecutions of the press and notes that prior 
 
 90.  ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 610–11 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 91.  See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
 92.  Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 
U.S. 454, 461–62 (1907)). 
 93.  Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462. 
 94.  Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 95.  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (“It well may be that the 
prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, 
although to prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson.”). 
 96.  See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672–73 (1925) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 97.  Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing AMAR, supra note 6, at 23–
24). 
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restraints were troublesome because they removed jury protections, 
later in his book Amar explicitly rejects the narrow Blackstonian 
reading of the Press Clause.98 He does this in part based on theories 
of popular sovereignty, but also because he considers the Speech and 
Press Clauses to be “in pari materia.”99 Amar argues that since 
limiting the Speech Clause to “freedom from prior restraint is utterly 
outlandish,” it must also be true that the Press Clause is not 
so limited.100 
That leaves Blackstone as the ultimate and only independent 
source of the narrow reading of the Press Clause. Blackstone did say 
that freedom of the press meant only freedom from previous 
restraints. However, Blackstone, writing in 1769, was not referring 
to the meaning of the First Amendment, drafted twenty years later, 
but was talking about the English common law. To assume that 
Blackstone’s meaning was adopted wholly by the Framers of the First 
Amendment is a major leap, and as we shall see, a contested one. 
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Blackstone had some 
influence on the thinking of the Framers. Consequently, he cannot 
be discounted entirely. 
Even if Posner’s sources do not fully support his assertion this 
does not mean he is wrong. Furthermore, Amar’s argument that the 
Speech and Press Clauses are in pari materia (which is essentially 
identical to an argument made two centuries earlier by Albert 
Gallatin against the Blackstonian reading of the Press Clause101) is 
not altogether satisfying. For all of the reasons stated above, 
whatever the linguistic parallelism in the text of the First 
Amendment, speech and the press were very different means of 
communication in the eighteenth century with very different 
histories. So, while it is possible that freedom of the press meant the 
same thing to the Framers as freedom of speech, one cannot 
so assume. 
What is needed, then, is a close examination of the history of 
press regulation and freedom before and during the Framing era. 
Leonard Levy has engaged in precisely such a close examination in 
 
 98.  See AMAR, supra note 6, at 23–24, 223–24. 
 99.  Id. at 224. 
 100.  Id. at 223–24. 
 101.  See LEVY, supra note 9, at 303–04. 
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Emergence of a Free Press102 (which is a revised and expanded version 
of his groundbreaking book Legacy of Suppression103). When one 
reads Levy’s recitation of history, the overwhelming impression is 
one of confusion and uncertainty. There were undoubtedly some 
members of the Framing generation, notably James Wilson during 
the ratification debates and many Federalists during the debates over 
the Sedition Act, who whole-heartedly defended the narrow, 
Blackstonian reading of the Press Clause.104 However, there is a rich 
intellectual history predating the First Amendment suggesting that a 
broader, albeit somewhat inchoate, understanding of freedom of the 
press had evolved by 1789. Moreover, there is no dispute that 
during the Sedition Act debates (i.e., by the end of the eighteenth 
century), a very large number of prominent thinkers, all associated 
with Jefferson’s Democratic-Republican Party, were articulating a 
clear, intellectually coherent, and broad vision of press freedoms that 
went well beyond freedom from prior restraints.105 A brief 
examination of the history of press freedoms in the colonies and after 
independence demonstrates why a simple assertion that the 
Blackstonian view of the Press Clause constituted “the original 
understanding”106 is so problematic. 
Let us start by discussing the law of seditious libel, because that 
is Levy’s focus, and it created the key confrontation between narrow 
and broad readings of the Press Clause in 1798. The crime of 
seditious libel was, of course, brought to the colonies from England, 
along with the principle that truth was no defense to such a charge 
and various procedural rules designed to favor the prosecution 
(notably the rule that the judge, not the jury, was to determine if the 
charged words were seditious).107 Seditious libel prosecutions, 
however, were almost unknown in colonial America, and they ended 
completely after the famously unsuccessful prosecution of Peter 
 
 102.  See LEVY, supra note 9. 
 103.  LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN 
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1964). 
 104.  See Kurland, supra note 9, at 235–36 (describing Wilson’s speech at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention); LEVY, supra note 9, at 204–05 (doing the same); id. at 301 
& n.75 (discussing speeches by Federalists during the Sedition Act debates). 
 105.  Id. at 301–04. 
 106.  ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 610–11 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 107.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 7–12. 
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Zenger in 1735.108 It is noteworthy that during Zenger’s 
prosecution, his attorney, Andrew Hamilton, explicitly argued that 
freedom of the press required proof of falsity for a charge of 
seditious libel, and that the question of libel must be sent to the 
jury—that is, he urged the jury to reject the traditional English rule 
as tyrannical.109 And whatever the legal merits of Hamilton’s 
argument, he did convince the jury, which refused to convict.110 Levy 
concedes that the Zenger prosecution became a symbol in colonial 
America of the unjustness of the law of seditious libel and of the 
importance of a free press,111 indicating that as early as 1735 a 
broader understanding of freedom of the press was emerging in 
American thought and popular consciousness, even if legal 
precedents had not been altered.112 
Moreover, this broader understanding did not emerge out of the 
ether, nor did its evolution end with the Zenger case. In the two 
decades prior to the Zenger case, two English journalists writing 
under the name “Cato” had set forth a well-developed theory of 
freedom of speech and of the press, which recognized the essential 
role of such freedom in checking the abuse of official authority, and 
which specifically criticized aspects of the law of seditious libel, 
notably that truth was not a defense.113 These arguments, published 
in book form under the title “Cato’s Letters,” were extensively 
distributed and quoted in the colonies, and were explicitly referred 
to by many leading members of the Framing generation, including 
John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin.114 That John 
Adams was aware of and approved of Cato’s arguments is particularly 
significant because of a later episode. In 1789, Chief Justice William 
Cushing of Massachusetts initiated a correspondence with John 
Adams regarding the meaning of the free press clause of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, which Adams had drafted. In his letter, 
Cushing raised and explicitly repudiated Blackstone’s understanding 
limiting freedom of the press to an absence of prior restraints, and he 
cited Cato in support of his view in particular that the clause 
 
 108.  Id. at 17–18. 
 109.  Id. at 41–43. 
 110.  Id. at 43–44. 
 111.  Id. at 37–38. 
 112.  See Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 17. 
 113.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 109–13. 
 114.  Id. at 113–14. 
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required that truth may not be prosecuted as seditious libel.115 
Adams agreed in his reply, arguing that whatever the law in England, 
the democratic Constitution of Massachusetts required that citizens 
be able to truthfully criticize government officials.116 
Nor was Adams alone or unusual in his views, as illustrated by a 
sequence of incidents twenty years earlier in Massachusetts involving 
another (colonial era) Chief Justice and another Adams. In 1768, 
then Governor Francis Bernard sought the support of the lower 
house of the Massachusetts legislature in initiating a seditious libel 
prosecution based on a newspaper story which vilified the governor. 
The house refused, adopting (for the first time) a resolution in favor 
of the “Liberty of the Press.”117 Chief Justice Hutchinson of 
Massachusetts sought to nonetheless obtain an indictment, citing in 
support the narrow Blackstonian definition of liberty of the press. 
The grand jury also refused to give its support. And in response to 
these events, the leading patriot (and John Adams’s cousin) Samuel 
Adams published a series of articles extolling the freedom of the 
press as the essential “bulwark of the People’s Liberties.”118 Adams’s 
language is particularly interesting because it is so closely echoed in 
the eventual language, twenty years later, of both George Mason’s 
Master Bill of Rights that provided the key model for the Bill of 
Rights,119 and (reflecting Mason) James Madison’s original proposal 
to Congress, which eventually lead to the Bill of Rights.120 It is 
essential to note that Adams’s arguments were triggered not by a 
proposal to impose prior restraints, but by a subsequent prosecution 
of speech. 
It should be no surprise that this broader reading of press 
freedoms was not limited to either the Adams cousins or to 
Massachusetts. Indeed, such opinions can be found much earlier 
than the two episodes just recounted. To give just two examples 
 
 115.  Id. at 199–200. 
 116.  Id. at 200. There is, of course, some irony in this given the Adams Administration’s 
later support for and enforcement of the Sedition Act; but, as we shall see, this irony does have 
an explanation. 
 117.  Id. at 66. 
 118.  Id. at 67 (quoting Adams, BOS. GAZETTE, Mar. 14, 1768). 
 119.  See Mason’s Master Draft, supra note 48, at ¶ 16 (“[T]he Freedom of the Press is 
one of the great Bulwarks of Liberty, and ought not to be violated.”). 
 120.  THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 83 (“[T]he freedom of the 
press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”). 
BHAGWAT.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/2016  4:26 PM 
1151 Posner, Blackstone, and Prior Restraints on Speech 
 1173 
among many, in 1722, a young printer named Benjamin Franklin 
reprinted one of Cato’s essays in defense of his brother James who 
had been imprisoned by the legislature (so again, not in response to 
a prior restraint).121 Nine years later, in 1731, Ben Franklin published 
a more extensive defense of press freedoms, this time in his own 
voice.122 At about the same time, James Alexander, a well-known 
lawyer and friend of Peter Zenger, published articles strongly 
defending press freedoms as essential in a limited, as opposed to an 
absolute, monarchy, and explicitly extended his definition to include 
some immunity from subsequent prosecution.123 
There is thus little doubt that a substantial school of thought had 
developed in the American colonies, brought to the forefront by the 
1735 Zenger prosecution and continuing to develop afterwards, that 
defined the freedom of the press to mean more than freedom from 
prior restraints.124 What exactly that meant was no doubt 
underdeveloped and somewhat inchoate in the minds of most. 
However, at a minimum, as Levy concedes, it appears to have 
encompassed permitting truth as a defense, permitting general jury 
verdicts, and requiring proof of malicious intent in seditious libel 
prosecutions.125 Indeed, in 1804 none other than Alexander 
Hamilton argued that freedom of the press required truth as a 
defense in a seditious libel prosecution.126 This is no doubt why in his 
1985 book, Emergence of a Free Press, Levy explicitly repudiated the 
notion hinted at in his 1960 book, Legacy of Suppression, that the 
original intent of the Press Clause of the First Amendment was to 
prevent prior restraints and nothing more.127 
The reason for Levy’s original mistake was simple—it was not 
truly the question he was addressing. The question that Levy was 
focused on, both in 1960 and in 1985, was whether the First 
Amendment eliminated entirely the crime of seditious libel. And on 
 
 121.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 119. 
 122.  Id. at 119–120. Franklin, unsurprisingly, continued to defend freedom of the press 
into his later years. See CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 17. 
 123.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 124–27. 
 124.  For further support of for this position, see CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 17–18. 
 125.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 169–70. 
 126.  CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 28 & n.60. 
 127.  LEVY, supra note 9, at xi. Levy’s recantation probably explains why Judge Posner 
did not cite Levy in his ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez opinion, despite the fact that Levy is the 
leading modern voice for a narrow reading of the original intent of the First Amendment’s 
speech and press clauses. 
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that question, he held to his belief that it had not, albeit it may have 
required the modifications described previously regarding truth as a 
defense, general jury verdicts, and proof of malice.128 In so arguing, 
Levy notes, he is rejecting the contrary statements of such luminaries 
as Justice Holmes,129 Justice Black,130 Justice Brennan speaking for a 
unanimous Court in New York Times v. Sullivan,131 and Professor 
Zechariah Chafee.132 As to whether Levy is right in this regard, it is 
very difficult to say. He may well be correct that, at least until the 
controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798, opinions had not fully 
formed on the subject, and as such there was no clearly crystalized 
“intent” on that issue. This is not to say, however, that if someone 
had asked leading Framers such as James Madison in 1791 whether 
seditious libel prosecutions were consistent with the First 
Amendment that they would have agreed that they were—there is 
simply no way to know the answer to the latter question. But the 
notion that a large part of the Framing generation understood the 
First Amendment at least to limit, if not to eliminate, seditious libel 
is supported by the fact that the Sedition Act of 1798, drafted, after 
all, by arch Federalists, incorporated the restrictions described 
previously, including truth as a defense, general jury verdicts, and a 
requirement of proof of malice.133 
Much of the support for the narrow Blackstonian reading of the 
Press Clause appears to be built on the premise that the only 
alternative is to permit no subsequent punishment of speech, even if 
libelous or otherwise dangerous. But this is a straw man at best. It is 
true that even prior to the adoption of the First Amendment some 
thinkers, including notably Montesquieu, had raised the possibility 
that only overt acts, not speech, should be subject to punishment;134 
and more recently there were times when Justice Black seemed to 
 
 128.  Id. at xiii. 
 129.  Id. at xiii & n.5 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 130.  Id. at xiii & n.6 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1951) (Black, 
J., dissenting)). 
 131.  Id. at xiii & n.7 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
 132.  Id. at xiii–xiv & n.10 (citing CHAFEE, supra note 54, at 21). 
 133.  Id. at xi; GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH DURING WARTIME 
43–44 (2004). 
 134.  See LEVY, supra note 9, at 151–53, 163–68. 
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hint at such a broad reading.135 But that has never been the 
mainstream view, either in the judiciary or among commentators. 
Indeed, when the Supreme Court addressed the issue of libel against 
public officials—the modern cousin of seditious libel—in New York 
Times v. Sullivan, it did not entirely forbid such lawsuits; instead, it 
merely required proof of falsehood and “actual malice,” meaning 
that the speaker knew the statement was false or recklessly 
disregarded the truth.136 The real question, as Levy recognizes, is not 
whether the First Amendment permitted any punishment for 
publication or speech—of course it did—but where the line was to 
be drawn between protected speech on the one hand, and “abuse” 
or “licentious” speech on the other.137 And on that question, there 
was probably little thought given before the controversy of 1798, 
which exposed deep divides. 
This takes us to the Sedition Act of 1798, undoubtedly the 
formative moment in early American thinking about freedom of 
speech and the press. Geoffrey Stone accurately describes the 
Sedition Act as “[t]he centerpiece of the Federalists’ legislative 
program of 1798,” adopted in response to concerns about 
impending war with France and Jacobinism within the rival 
Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson.138 Moreover, 
Federalist supporters of the Act defended it by adopting Blackstone’s 
narrow understanding of press freedoms.139 
As noted previously, however, the Sedition Act did not simply 
replicate the English common law; rather, it incorporated the liberal 
restrictions advocated for during and after the Zenger prosecution.140 
By this time, however, it had become clear to the Republicans that 
these “reforms” were going to prove wholly illusory because 
prosecutions were generally directed at political opinions, whose 
truth it was impossible to prove (the burden lay on the defendant), 
and because Federalist juries were anxious to convict their political 
opponents.141 And indeed, the protections were entirely ineffective, 
 
 135.  Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157–59 (1959); New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 293, 295 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). 
 136.  New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
 137.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 273–74, 303–04. 
 138.  STONE, supra note 133, at 36, 43, 67. 
 139.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 301–02; STONE, supra note 133, at 40–41. 
 140.  STONE, supra note 133, at 43–44. 
 141.  Id. at 44. 
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placing no obstacles to the Federalists’ use of the Act to harass and 
suppress their political opponents.142 
The passage of the Sedition Act, its biased enforcement, and the 
failure of the limitations written into the Act to prevent its abuse 
forced the intellectual leaders of the Republican Party, for the first 
time, to confront key questions regarding the role of free speech and 
freedom of the press in a republic based on popular sovereignty, as 
well as whether seditious libel prosecutions were consistent with that 
role. What emerged was a sophisticated theory linking freedom of 
the press to democracy and rejecting seditious libel as inconsistent 
with the concept of popular sovereignty.143 In the congressional 
debates over the Sedition Act, Republican congressmen John 
Nicholas and Albert Gallatin rejected the argument that providing 
truth as a defense was sufficient to protect political opinion and, in 
the course of doing so, rejected the Blackstonian reading of either 
the Speech or Press Clauses.144 In a debate over repealing the 
Sedition Act in 1799, Nicholas took the argument one step further. 
He argued that the entire law of seditious libel was based on the 
British system of hereditary monarchy and simply had no place in the 
United States, where the people were sovereign and government 
officers were their servants.145 A number of other Republican 
politicians and authors followed suit, expounding the developing 
theory that popular sovereignty required strong protections for the 
press and that prosecutions for seditious libel violated 
those protections.146 
The most famous Republican attack on the Sedition Act was 
undoubtedly Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, issued by 
the Virginia House of Delegates in 1800.147 In it, Madison fully 
explicates the Republican reading of the First Amendment, 
explaining that the common law of seditious libel was based on the 
British system of government, in which only the King was seen as a 
threat to liberty. 
 
 142.  Id. at 44, 46–48, 67–68. 
 143.  Id. at 43. 
 144.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 301–04. 
 145.  Id. at 310–11. 
 146.  Id. at 311–15. 
 147.  James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 293 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (Jan. 1800), http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs24.html. 
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In the United States the case is altogether different. The People, 
not the Government, possess the absolute sovereignty. The 
Legislature, no less than the Executive, is under limitations of 
power. . . . This security of the freedom of the press requires that it 
be exempt not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in 
Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and this 
exemption, to be effectual, must be an exemption not only from 
the previous inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent 
penalty of laws.148 
He then went on to argue that press freedoms were intrinsically tied 
to “governments elective, limited, and responsible, in all their 
branches” because of the need for the press to “canvass[] the merits 
and measures of public men.”149 In short, by 1800 Madison had 
developed and expounded a fully formed theory of free expression, 
tied to democratic government and popular sovereignty, which 
repudiated not only Blackstone but also the view that the crime of 
seditious libel only needed reform, not abandonment. 
One final Republican thinker that is worthy of particular 
attention is St. George Tucker. Tucker was Professor of Law at the 
College of William and Mary in Virginia, and in 1803 he published 
an extremely influential American version of Blackstone along with 
an appendix in which he considered how the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights altered the English common law.150 In it, Tucker built on 
Madison’s Report, arguing that Blackstone’s reading of freedom of 
the press was only the English understanding, and that in America, 
because of the principle of popular sovereignty, the press and the 
people must enjoy an absolute right to inquire about and criticize 
their agents.151 Regarding individual libel or slander, Tucker’s view 
was that, again, Congress lacked all authority, but recourse to state 
courts remained open.152 
 
 148.  Id.; see also STONE, supra note 133, at 45; LEVY, supra note  9, at 316–17. 
 149.  Report on the Virginia Resolutions, supra note 147. 
 150.  St. George Tucker, Appendix to Volume First, Part Second, in BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., 1803). 
 151.  Id. at 15, 17–20, 24, 28–29; St. George Tucker, Appendix to Volume First, Part 
First, in BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 297–98 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803). 
 152.  Id. at 298–99. 
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It is thus obvious that by the end of the eighteenth century, one 
of the dominant political movements in the United States, which as 
of the election of 1800 was to take control of the entire elected 
federal government, had developed a capacious understanding of 
freedom of the press, rooted in strong views about democratic 
politics and popular sovereignty, which went far beyond the narrow 
vision of Blackstone, and even beyond the reforms proposed in the 
wake of the Zenger prosecution. The response of defenders of the 
Blackstonian position appears to be that this reading of the First 
Amendment was made up out of whole cloth in response to the 
Sedition Act and has no relevance to the understandings of 1789–
1791.153 This may, of course, be true, but there are reasons to be 
skeptical. First of all, it should be noted that the criticism of 
Republican theories of free speech in 1798 as partisan and 
opportunistic are equally applicable to the Federalists who defended 
the Sedition Act on Blackstonian grounds. Moreover, it is 
particularly dubious to accept the Federalists’ interpretation of the 
First Amendment as gospel in light of their original opposition to 
the entire Bill of Rights. In truth, given the viciously partisan 
atmosphere of 1798–1800, it is hard to imagine anyone on either 
side adopting positions based on thoughtful contemplation, as 
opposed to hopes of partisan advantage. 
It is also not true that there were simply no precedents for the 
broad, Republican theory of free speech before 1798. As early as 
1794 Madison, in congressional debates over the Democratic-
Republican societies, articulated a broad vision of free speech and 
freedom of the press, rooted in popular sovereignty, that provides a 
clear antecedent to his Report of 1800.154 Furthermore, while St. 
George Tucker’s version of Blackstone was not published until 1803, 
it was based on lecture notes that he began developing in 1790. 
Obviously, the references to the Sedition Act had to have been 
written after 1798, but there is no way to know if he had begun 
developing his theories at an earlier date. Most fundamentally, as 
David Rabban has pointed out, English Whig Radicals had 
developed theories of free expression based on popular sovereignty 
 
 153.  See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 9, at 321–22. 
 154.  Id. at 293–94, 322. 
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long before the American Revolution,155 and while these radicals had 
little influence in England, highly respected modern scholarship that 
Rabban cites demonstrates their profound influence on American 
Revolutionary thought.156 Certainly it is true that in the early 1790s, 
long before the Sedition Act, the Democratic-Republican societies 
had linked free speech with popular sovereignty, laying the 
groundwork for the later Republican position.157 At an intellectual 
level, Rabban points out that Blackstone’s conservatism was rooted 
in his rejection of the Radical Whig theory of popular sovereignty in 
favor of parliamentary sovereignty.158 Given that the Framers 
unequivocally rejected Blackstone’s theory of sovereignty (even 
James Wilson condemned Blackstone),159 it seems highly implausible 
that the Framers, creators of a Constitution whose first words were 
“We the People,” intended to accept his narrow view of freedom of 
the press that was premised on that theory.160 
None of this is to say that there was in 1791, when the Bill of 
Rights was ratified, a well-accepted understanding that the Press 
Clause eliminated the law of seditious libel—among the wealth of 
issues faced by the nation’s leaders in the early Republic, this was 
surely not one to which they would have given much thought. 
Indeed, it cannot be definitively proven that the Framers accepted 
that the First Amendment required reform of seditious libel, though 
the evidence here is more compelling. Benjamin Franklin probably 
came closest to stating the truth of the matter when he said in 1789 
regarding the First Amendment that “few of us” had any “distinct 
Ideas of its Nature and Extent.”161 Hamilton said much the same 
thing in the Federalist Papers.162 Levy probably says it best when he 
 
 155.  Rabban, supra note 50, at 823–24 (giving a brief synopsis of existing scholarship on 
the influence of English Whig Radicals in America). 
 156.  Id. at 801, 821–22, 827–28 (citing, e.g., Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and 
Early American Historiography, 39 WM & MARY Q. 334 (1982); BERNARD BAILYN, THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967)). 
 157.  Rabban, supra note 50, at 845–46; see also id. at 821. 
 158.  Id. at 826–27. 
 159.  See STONE, supra note 133, at 42–43; Rabban, supra note 50, at 828–29. 
 160.  See Rabban, supra note 50, at 829–30. 
 161.  STONE, supra note 133, at 42 (quoting Benjamin Franklin, An Account of the 
Supremest Court of Judicature in Pennsylvania, viz. The Court of the Press (Sept. 12, 1789), in 
10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 37 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1907)). 
 162.  See Meyerson, supra note 38, at 320 & n.176 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
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comments: “Whether the Framers themselves knew what they had in 
mind is uncertain. At the time of the drafting and ratification of the 
First Amendment, few among them clearly understood what they 
meant by the free speech-and-press clause, and we cannot know that 
those few represented a consensus.”163 What is clear—indeed the 
only thing that is clear—is that any firm statements about the 
original intent of the First Amendment should be met with extreme 
skepticism given the paucity and contradictory nature of the 
historical evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The question this essay sought to answer was whether Judge 
Posner was correct in flatly asserting that “the original 
understanding” of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment 
was to bar censorship—i.e., previous or prior restraints—and nothing 
else. A perusal of the historical record, as well as the scholarship, 
fairly clearly indicates that while there are no clear answers to exactly 
what the First Amendment meant to the Framers, some conclusions 
are possible. It is probably true that the Free Speech Clause was not 
limited to barring prior restraints because that would denude the 
clause of all meaning, but given the Framers’ lack of attention to 
speech, no smoking-gun evidence can be found either way. As for 
the Press Clause, again the better reading is probably that it was not 
so limited, but here even greater uncertainty reigns, especially 
because there were undoubtedly differences of opinion among the 
Framers. Given this paucity of certain answers, can any lessons be 
drawn here? I think that two themes do emerge. 
The first concerns the difficulties of “translation”—to use Larry 
Lessig’s metaphor164—of constitutional meaning from the Framing 
era to the present, given the massive technological and societal 
changes that separate us. Today, we generally describe all forms of 
expression as “speech,” and as such treat the Press Clause as largely 
subsumed by the Speech Clause. Given modern communications 
technology, that conflation makes sense; indeed, it seems 
unavoidable. In the Framing era, however, speech and the press were 
very different things, with different social and political roles. 
Furthermore, for the Framers it was the press that most mattered 
 
 163.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 268. 
 164.  See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
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and was the center of controversy; free speech barely entered their 
consciousness. The result is that looking back, we fail to see that 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press did not mean the same 
thing in 1791, and we thus cannot assume that something said about 
the press applies to speech, or vice-versa. More generally, it is 
necessary to be extremely cautious about how we understand casual 
statements from a very different era without giving careful thought 
to the social and technological context they reflect. 
The second theme concerns the occasionally problematic nature 
of the entire originalist enterprise. There is no doubt that there are 
good, principled arguments in favor of interpreting the Constitution 
based on its original meaning. The difficulty, as this short essay has 
demonstrated, is that there is often no there there.165 With many 
important constitutional provisions, including notably the Speech 
and Press Clauses of the First Amendment, the Framers adopted 
broad language stating abstract principles where there was broad 
consensus, but they thought little of the details of what those 
principles meant in practice. As Levy puts it, “the Constitution was 
purposely made to embody first ideas and sketchy notions.”166 To 
make matters worse, when they were finally forced to consider 
specific questions, as happened during the Sedition Act controversy, 
the Framers turned out to have sharply different views regarding the 
proper answers, and even regarding basic political theory.167 What, in 
that situation, is an originalist to do? Perhaps it is to concede that 




 165.  Cf. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937). 
 166.  LEVY, supra note 9, at 348. 
 167.  See STONE, supra note 133, at 43 (discussing the very different political theories of 
the Federalists and Republicans). 
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